Three lenses on a Pelosi trade — and why the one Congress hopes you ignore is the one that decides enforcement
Most Pelosi coverage shows you one benchmark. Capitol Markets shows three because the difference between them is where Congressional-trading enforcement actually lives.

On January 16, 2026, Representative Nancy Pelosi (Democrat, California) bought between $1.25 million and $2.5 million of Amazon, NVIDIA, Alphabet, and Vistra in a single day's filings (H. Clerk PTR P000197, 2026 reports). Through May 7 those four buys, plus a January 2 Verisign exchange, are up an estimated 14.7 percent on $2,050,024 of disclosed dollar volume. The S&P 500 returned 7.1 percent over the same window. The Technology Select Sector SPDR returned 17.6 percent. Capitol Markets shows you all three numbers because the difference between them is where Congressional-trading enforcement actually lives — and it is the difference Congress most hopes voters never read about.
Most Pelosi coverage shows you exactly one lens. The trackers that lead with "Pelosi beat the market by 9 points" pick the broad-market lens because it tells the loudest story. The trackers that flatter her cherry-pick a longer window where the math gets more impressive. Capitol Markets shows three lenses on every politician — broad-market alpha, sector-adjusted alpha, and per-trade marked-to-market — because the lens you pick is the answer you get. Pelosi's 2026 year-to-date trades return 14.7 percent. Against the broad market she is up 9.2 percentage points. Against the sector she actually bought into, she is down 0.7. Against her own five-year record (+12.5 percentage points of sector-adjusted alpha across 73 disclosed trades and an estimated $20,479,168 in net profit), this year is a slow start.
The reason any of this matters has nothing to do with whether Pelosi is a good investor. Under the Dirks v. SEC (1983) and Salman v. United States (2016) tippee-liability doctrines, an ordinary trader who profits from material nonpublic information can be charged criminally if a fact-finder concludes their abnormal returns are not explainable by ordinary risk premia. The benchmark a court would use is not "did you beat the S&P 500" — it is "did your sector-adjusted, risk-adjusted return exceed what an honestly-informed trader could have produced." Sector-adjusted alpha is the closer-to-honest benchmark. A trader who loaded up on Tech in early 2026 collected most of that 17.6 percent through sector beta — being long the sector that rallied — not through stock selection. A senior congressional figure with committee access to nonpublic legislative pipeline information is functionally a tippee whenever she trades inside a sector under her oversight. Whether she is benefitting from material nonpublic information is the question. The benchmark question is what defines whether the answer is even askable.
Pelosi's January 16 buys were Amazon, NVIDIA, Alphabet, and Vistra. The first three are core holdings of every congressional Technology committee's de facto jurisdiction — antitrust, semiconductor export policy, AI safety, content moderation. The fourth, Vistra, is a power utility whose stock has been driven by the AI-data-center power-demand thesis since mid-2025 (SEC Form 10-K, Vistra Corp, fiscal year 2024). All four trades benefit from being long the same exposure: AI capital expenditure. The disclosures filed thirty days later, exactly at the STOCK Act ceiling, do not say where she got the conviction. They are not required to. That is the regulatory gap Senator Josh Hawley's PELOSI Act and the bipartisan Restore Trust in Congress Act exist to close.
Both bills would prohibit members of Congress and their spouses from trading individual stocks while in office, requiring divestiture or blind-trust transfer within 180 days. Senator Josh Hawley's PELOSI Act (introduced as Senate Bill 1498, 119th Congress, and reported out of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee with bipartisan support after being amended and renamed the HONEST Act in committee) has been waiting for floor action ever since (S.1498, Library of Congress). The companion measure in the House, the Restore Trust in Congress Act, was introduced in September 2025 (H.R.5106, Library of Congress). Floor schedules are set by leadership. Senator Chuck Schumer in the Senate and Speaker Mike Johnson in the House control whether either measure moves. Neither has scheduled a vote.
The academic spine of this argument has been published peer-reviewed for two decades. Ziobrowski and colleagues found that Senators outperformed the market by twelve percentage points annualized over the 1993-1998 window (Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2004). A 2011 follow-up paper found the same effect for House members (Business and Politics, 2011). The papers used broad-market benchmarks. They did not adjust for sector. The results survived the cruder test. The harder, more honest test — sector-adjusted, multi-year, every-disclosed-trade — is what Capitol Markets ships. The cases where alpha persists after that adjustment are the cases the reform argument actually rests on. Pelosi's five-year record is one of those cases. That is why she is the political-financial figure most often cited in the reform debate, and why the bills meant to constrain trades like hers carry her name.
The fix is not better journalism. The fix is real-time disclosure (eliminate the 30-to-45-day window during which a member of Congress can trade and let the news cycle bury it before voters see), a pre-trade restriction on individual-stock ownership for members and spouses (the PELOSI Act and the Restore Trust in Congress Act), and civil penalties scaled to trade size rather than the current $200 fixed late-filing fee that a member earning a six-figure salary can absorb without flinching (STOCK Act Section 6(b), 5 U.S.C. § 13107). All three are written. None of the three has been enacted. The Senate's Homeland Security Committee advanced one of them out of committee with bipartisan support and it has not seen the floor since.
The full Pelosi profile, with her January 16 trades and the three lenses Capitol Markets shows for each, is at capitolmarkets.org/politicians/nancy-pelosi. Every other politician in the database is rendered the same way — same three lenses, same primary-source citations, same committee-conflict cross-references. The leaderboard, ranked by sector-adjusted alpha and credibility-weighted skill, is at capitolmarkets.org/leaderboard. The methodology page documents how every benchmark is computed at capitolmarkets.org/methodology.
A note on what this is not. None of the above is an accusation that any disclosed trade was illegal. The STOCK Act allows it. The bills meant to change that are stalled. Capitol Markets reports the public record and grades it against the most honest benchmark available. What Congress does is up to Congress.
— Capitol Markets
Public record. Plain English. Not investment advice.
Sources
- House Clerk Periodic Transaction Reports, filer Pelosi (2026 reports). https://disclosures-clerk.house.gov/PublicDisclosure/FinancialDisclosure (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Capitol Markets methodology page. https://capitolmarkets.org/methodology (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Capitol Markets Pelosi profile. https://capitolmarkets.org/politicians/nancy-pelosi (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Senate Bill 1498, 119th Congress (PELOSI Act, reported out of committee as the HONEST Act). https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1498/text (accessed 2026-05-08)
- House Bill 5106, 119th Congress (Restore Trust in Congress Act). https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/5106/text (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, 5 U.S.C. § 13107 (Section 6(b) penalty schedule). https://www.congress.gov/112/plaws/publ105/PLAW-112publ105.pdf (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/463/646/ (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Salman v. United States, 580 U.S. 39 (2016). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/580/15-628/ (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Ziobrowski, A. J., Cheng, P., Boyd, J. W., & Ziobrowski, B. J. (2004). "Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(4), 661-676. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/abs/abnormal-returns-from-the-common-stock-investments-of-the-us-senate/64A6BF8CC0D4E4C73AF31A4DD1FCFFB1 (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Ziobrowski, A. J., Boyd, J. W., Cheng, P., & Ziobrowski, B. J. (2011). "Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives." Business and Politics, 13(1), 1-22. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-politics/article/abs/abnormal-returns-from-the-common-stock-investments-of-members-of-the-us-house-of-representatives/CA2DCFE49C5C84E13E6BD5E4EC52391C (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Vistra Corp 10-K filing, fiscal 2024. https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001692819&type=10-K (accessed 2026-05-08)
- Yahoo Finance daily-close history for SPY and XLK, ingested into Capitol Markets PriceBar table. https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/XLK (accessed 2026-05-08)
Public record. STOCK Act-disclosed trades referenced here are legal under existing law. This piece argues for legislative change. It is not an accusation of insider trading or any other crime against any named individual.